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This paper formulates and estimates a dynamic programming model of optimal educational financing
decisions. The main purpose of the paper is to measure the effect of short-term parental cash transfers,
received during school, on educational borrowing and in-school work decisions, and on post-graduation
lifetime earnings. The estimated parameters of the model imply that parental cash transfers do not
significantly influence post-graduation lifetime earnings. Long-term factors such as family background
and prior human capital investments are more important. Parental cash transfers do, however, significantly
determine the decision to borrow or work during school and the level of lifetime consumption.
1. INTRODUCTION
This paper formulates and estimates a dynamic programming model of optimal educational
financing decisions. The main purpose of the paper is to measure the effect of short-term parental
cash transfers, received during school, on educational borrowing and in-school work decisions,
and on post-graduation lifetime earnings. The effect of short-term parental cash transfers is
assessed relative to the effects of long-term factors such as family background and prior human
capital investments. Knowledge of the relative importance of parental cash transfers and the
determinants of the decision to borrow or work is important for predicting the impact of recent
changes in education policy. Tuition tax credits are now available and will most probably lead
to an increase in the level of parental cash transfers to offspring. Educational loan-forgiveness
programmes that presumably influence borrowing decisions and post-graduation career choices
are also expanding.1
Several recent studies have sought to measure the relative importance of parental cash
transfers on lifetime outcomes. These studies generally examine the correlation between family
income and schooling attainment (see, e.g. Cameron and Heckman (1998, 2001), Shea (2000),
Keane and Wolpin (2001)). A key insight of these studies is that the well documented and strong
correlation between family background and completed schooling levels does not necessarily
constitute evidence that short-term parental cash transfers help relieve liquidity constraints thus
enabling offspring to attain higher education levels. Family income could also represent long-
term influences that foster scholastic ability and preferences for more schooling. Indeed, when
some measure of offspring ability is included in the analysis the correlation between family
income and completed schooling levels is either wiped out or reverses direction.
This study differs from the previous literature in at least three ways. First, instead of focusing
on variation in the level of educational attainment with family income, the focus is on variation
1. Tax benefits for investments in higher education are available through the hope credit, the lifetime learning
credit and various education IRAs. Although private loan-forgiveness programmes have existed for many years, a
federal teacher loan-forgiveness programme has recently been instituted and student loan interest payments are now
tax deductible.
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in lifetime earnings with educational financing decisions and family background among a group
of individuals that have approximately the same years and quality of schooling. All individuals
in the sample have an undergraduate degree and completed 3 years of additional schooling at the
same Law School. The effect of parental cash transfers is thus analysed on a different margin.
Second, a direct measure of parental cash transfers is available in the data and is incorporated
into the analysis. Due to data limitations, previous studies could only indirectly infer the level of
parental financial support. Third, and perhaps most important, the accumulation of educational
debt is explicitly modelled and treated as endogenous. The decision to incur educational debt
takes into account the level of parental support, potential earnings in the labour market and the
consequences of indebtedness for current and future utility.
The mechanisms by which parental cash transfers influence educational financing decisions
and post-graduation lifetime earnings are fairly straightforward. Individuals that have decided to
invest in higher education may have to supplement parental monetary support by working while
in school and/or undertaking educational debt in order to fully finance the costs of attendance. An
individual that chooses to work while in school may, as a result, be less academically successful
due to less time and energy available for studying (see Ehrenberg and Sherman (1987), Eckstein
and Wolpin (1999)). In the case of Law School graduates, lower scholastic achievement can
affect career opportunities by lowering the arrival rate of job offers in high-paying legal jobs thus
leading to lower post-graduation lifetime earnings. On the other hand, working while in school
may offer a higher standard of living while studying and increase overall lifetime consumption
and utility even given the decrease in lifetime earnings upon graduation. Moreover, employment
during school may have investment value in the post-graduation labour market (see Ruhm
(1997), Light (2001), Hotz, Xu, Tienda and Ahituv (2002)). The pay-off to work experience
acquired while in school could partially compensate for the earnings loss due to lower scholastic
achievement.
In contrast to an individual that decides to work while in school, an individual that chooses
to undertake educational debt may be more academically successful than otherwise but will
generally not achieve a high standard of living during his or her studies. This is mainly due to the
institutional borrowing constraints inherent in federal student aid programmes and the relatively
high cost of borrowing on the commercial market. An individual that undertakes debt, as opposed
to working, will also have lower net consumption after graduation as soon as loan re-payment
begins. However, the level of debt accumulated during school can influence the type of job
that is accepted after graduation. Indeed, the presumption of many educational loan-forgiveness
programmes in elite Law Schools in the U.S. is that Law School graduates are shying away from
public service jobs because of initially low salaries and high educational debt service payments
that lead to unacceptably low levels of early post-graduation consumption. Under the assumption
that post-graduation borrowing constraints are binding, consumption smoothing considerations
may induce graduates that decided to undertake educational debt to choose jobs with initially
high salaries but with lower expected lifetime earnings.2
The theoretical framework, in which the effect of parental cash transfers is measured,
assumes that individuals maximize the discounted present value of expected lifetime utility by
making joint and sequential decisions on the level of educational indebtedness, whether to work
while in school and the type of post-graduation employment. Individuals choose, at the beginning
of each school year, whether to not work and not borrow, whether to not work and borrow half
the costs of attendance (including tuition, fees and minimum living expenses), whether to not
2. If individuals suffer a decrease in lifetime earnings in order to smooth post-graduation consumption, then there
must be an additional market failure which prevents firms from offering earnings profiles that match the individual’s
consumption needs. One possibility is that educational debt levels are unobserved or are very costly to monitor.
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work and borrow the full costs of attendance, whether to work and not borrow and whether to
work and borrow half the costs of attendance. The five options in the choice set are subject to a
feasibility constraint. An option is not available if the student cannot generate sufficient funds to
cover full attendance costs. If the student chooses not to work while in school, attendance costs
must be met by a combination of parental transfers, initial assets, unobserved (to the researcher)
assets accumulated during school and/or summers, and educational debt. If the student works,
stochastic labour income is added to the pool of resources. The default option of borrowing full
attendance costs and not working is assumed to always be available.
The decision problem the individual faces is formulated as a dynamic programming
problem under uncertainty so that borrowing and work decisions fully take into account the
expected consequences for scholastic achievement, future job opportunities and consumption
levels while in school and during the post-graduation period. Consumption is assumed to generate
contemporaneous utility through a CRRA function and the marginal utility of consumption is
allowed to differ between the borrowing and working options in order to capture the disutility
of work effort. The model of post-graduation labour market decisions is an expanded version of
the framework developed in Sauer (1998), in which Law School graduates choose, in each year
after graduation, between five employment sectors: a solo sector, a business sector, a non-profit
sector, a non-elite private law firm sector and an elite private law firm sector.
The dynamic programming problem is solved numerically by backward recursion. The
numerical solution is nested in a maximum likelihood procedure that recovers the structural
parameters of the decision problem. Construction of the likelihood function is based on simulated
event histories and assumes classification error in all reported discrete outcomes. The novel
estimation procedure, recently introduced by Keane and Wolpin (2001) and further developed in
Keane and Sauer (2002), “solves” the computational problem that arises when there are missing
endogenous state variables. The observed continuous data on parental transfers, initial assets,
educational debt, in-school employment earnings and accepted post-graduation wage offers are
included in estimation via measurement error densities.
The results of the study suggest that parental cash transfers do not have a significant effect
on post-graduation lifetime earnings. Family background and prior human capital investments
are stronger determinants. Parental cash transfers do, however, significantly affect the decision
to borrow or work. The effect depends on the level of transfers and on the individual’s potential
earnings in the labour market. Individuals with an intermediate level of transfers can be induced
to work while in school when additional transfers combine with market wages to enable the
student to reach higher lifetime consumption levels than can be achieved through less borrowing
only. The parental income supplement in this case decreases post-graduation lifetime earnings
since working while in school hurts scholastic achievement. On the other hand, in-school
work experience increases wages in the post-graduation labour market. The net effect on post-
graduation lifetime earnings when parental transfers induce in-school work turns out to be
negligible.
Although parental cash transfers do not significantly affect post-graduation lifetime
earnings, they do significantly affect lifetime consumption. Lifetime consumption increases with
parental cash transfers for two reasons. First, individuals that are induced to work rather than
borrow, and individuals that are not induced to work but rather borrow less, have lower post-
graduation debt service payments and higher post-graduation consumption. Second, individuals
that are induced to work increase in-school consumption levels over the in-school consumption
levels that are attainable through only borrowing. The estimated parameters of the model imply
that an extra dollar transferred from parent to offspring increases mean lifetime consumption by
1 dollar and 76 cents. The “additionality effect” of 76 cents can be decomposed into 14 cents of
increased in-school consumption and 62 cents of increased post-graduation consumption.
1192 REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data. Section 3 details
the structure of the model as well as the solution and estimation method. Section 4 presents
the main estimation results and discusses model fit. Section 5 measures the relative importance
of short-term parental cash transfers and simulates the impact of a loan-forgiveness programme
on educational borrowing and in-school work decisions, and on post-graduation career choices.
Section 6 summarizes and concludes.
2. DATA
The data on Law School graduates are drawn from alumni surveys administered by the University
of Michigan Law School (UMLS). UMLS has been collecting data from surveying all alumni
since 1952 and combines alumni responses with information from Law School records. This
paper uses information from the alumni surveys sent both 5 and 15 years after graduation to the
classes of 1976 through 1981. The 15-year survey sent to the class of 1981 was the last 15-year
survey available at the time this study began.
The 15-year alumni surveys provide detailed retrospective information on employment
outcomes since graduation from Law School as well as average weekly hours worked
during each Law School year. Starting with the class of 1976, data on sources of total
financial support over 3 years of Law School became available. Specifically, the survey
asks, “During Law School, approximately what percentages of your financial support came
from the following sources? (fill in blanks with percentages, totalling 100%).” The options
include (i) parental support, (ii) pre-Law School savings, (iii) veteran benefits, (iv) spousal
support, (v) employment earnings, (vi) educational loans, grants and scholarships and (vii) other
unspecified sources.
The reported percentages of financial support were converted into dollar figures by using
data on the estimated total cost of 3 years of attendance for in-state and out-of-state UMLS
students by class year. The total cost of attendance includes tuition, fees and living expenses.
The UMLS cost data are reported in Appendix B, which is available on the Review website. The
conversion from percentages to dollar figures assumes that the financial support referred to in the
survey question is understood as total attendance costs as determined by UMLS.
A direct dollar measure of total educational debt upon graduation is also requested in a
different question on the survey. This latter measure of debt is preferable to the converted debt
measure since it is not confounded with grants and scholarships. However, the direct dollar
measure of debt includes undergraduate debt as well. A similar concern is that total employment
earnings include summer earnings while the model explains in-school employment earnings only.
It should also be noted that parental support is interpreted as a pure transfer but could conceivably
be a (relatively low interest) loan. For all of these reasons, it is quite essential that measurement
error be incorporated into the estimation procedure.
The estimation sample contains a total of 658 white males that graduated within 3 years of
entry to Law School and that were not transfer students. Appendix C, which is available on the
Review website, reports the class size, the number of respondents to the more comprehensive
15-year survey and the size of the sample used in estimation by class year. In defining
the estimation sample, it was not necessary to censor incomplete event histories or impute
missing values. The estimation procedure is especially suited to handle the problem of missing
endogenous state variables.3
3. Two per cent of the white male respondents were transfer students and 6% took more than 3 years to graduate.
These individuals were excluded because including them would have considerably complicated the model and would
probably not have changed the results given that they do not provide a strong source of identification.
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TABLE 1
Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean S.D. N Symbol
Father’s occupation at entry to Law School:
Blue collar or other occupation 0·415 — 658 F0
Attorney or other professional 0·173 — 658 F1
Mgr., business owner or teacher 0·412 — 658 F2
Out-of-state resident 0·602 — 658 OS
Ivy League BA 0·120 — 658 Ivy
Master’s degree 0·090 — 658 MA
Age at entry to Law School 22·9 2·3 658 Age
Law School admissions test score 707 41·7 658 LSAT
Made law review 0·246 — 658 lr
Graduated in top 20% of class 0·391 — 658 t20
In-school work experience (years) 1·02 1·15 574 hrt
Parental transfers: tr pt
% > 0 0·606 — 650
Total 16,934 10,156 394
Initial assets: trat
% > 0 0·480 — 658
Total 12,643 8,574 311
Educational debt: dbt
% > 0 0·612 — 645
Total 21,021 14,930 395
Employment earnings: wt
% > 0 0·465 — 658
Total 9637 6639 302
Table 1 displays descriptive statistics and the symbols used in the model for corresponding
variables. Three broad occupational categories of the father at the time of entry to Law School
are defined in order to capture the individual’s family background. There is no other information
on family background in the data that can be usefully exploited. Most of the mothers in the
sample are not working at the time of entry to Law School. The three occupational categories
of the father are (i) attorney or other professional, (ii) manager, business owner or teacher, and
(iii) blue collar or other occupation. Investments in human capital prior to entering Law School
are represented by an indicator for having acquired a BA from an Ivy League institution, an
indicator for having acquired a master’s degree or higher, and age at entry to Law School. The
maximum age at Law School entry is 48 but only 15% of the sample entered over the age of 24.
Scholastic achievement in Law School is captured by an indicator for having made law
review after the first year and an indicator for having graduated in the top 20% of the class. Law
review status and graduating percentile are supplied from Law School records. The figures show
that 39% of the sample graduated in the top 20% of the class, highlighting the fact that survey
respondents are disproportionately academically successful students. The minimum graduating
percentile in the sample is 38.4
The data on sources of educational financing show that 61% of the sample received parental
monetary support. The mean positive amount of parental support is 17,000 dollars which is
slightly more than half the total 3-year attendance costs for out-of-state students. Sixty-one
4. There is no evidence to suggest that the relationship between parental transfers and lifetime earnings is
significantly different among the bottom third of the class.
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In-school work and parental transfers
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FIGURE 2
Educational debt and parental transfers
per cent of the sample also had positive educational debt. The mean positive amount of debt
is 21,000 dollars. All dollar figures are in 1992 dollars.
Initial assets and employment earnings during Law School are relatively less important
sources of financing. Initial assets are the sum of pre-Law School savings, veteran benefits,
spousal contributions and other unspecified sources. Pre-Law School savings constitute 60% of
initial assets. Employment earnings during Law School derive mostly from part-time work. The
average number of hours worked per week during each Law School year is 8·9 and a negligible
number of students worked more than 20 hours. For this reason, the model considers only no
work and part-time work options. A student was classified as working in a particular Law School
year if average weekly employment hours exceeded five.
Several additional aspects of the raw data are explored in Figures 1 and 2 and Table 2. Figure
1 displays the relationship between the propensity to work while in school and parental transfers.
Mean residuals from a pooled OLS regression, in which an indicator for working during the Law
School year is the dependent variable, are plotted against parental transfers measured in intervals
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TABLE 2
OLS lifetime earnings regressions
Log of lifetime earnings
Variable (1) (2) (3)
Constant 11·9172 11·9066 11·8207
(0·0355) (0·0397) (0·0452)
Father attorney/prof. 0·0189 0·0064 −0·0191
(0·0502) (0·0516) (0·0495)
Father mgr./teacher 0·0115 0·0025 −0·0042
(0·0376) (0·0381) (0·0371)
Ivy League BA 0·1120 0·1091 0·1092
(0·0544) (0·0545) (0·0526)
Master’s degree −0·0674 −0·0548 −0·0395
(0·0644) (0·0655) (0·0629)
I (age > 24) 0·0304 0·0429 0·0307
(0·0515) (0·0602) (0·0580)
Out-of-state resident 0·0073 0·0034 −0·0196
(0·0357) (0·0363) (0·0352)
I (L S AT > 737) −0·0402 −0·0409 −0·0686
(0·0401) (0·0402) (0·0390)
Parental transfers 0·00166 0·00152
(0·00174) (0·00172)
Initial assets 0·00026 −0·00039
(0·00146) (0·00142)
Law review 0·2125
(0·0404)
Top 20% of class 0·1092
(0·0353)
In-school work exp. 0·0256
(0·0151)
RM SE 0·3863 0·3865 0·3687
R2 0·0328 0·0327 0·1193
N 523 521 508
Note: Parental transfers and initial assets are divided by 1000. The regressions
also include controls for year of graduation. Robust standard errors are in
parentheses.
of 1750 dollars. The covariates in the regression are father’s broad occupational category, type of
BA, master’s degree status, age at entry to Law School, residency status, Law School admissions
test score, initial assets, graduation year and an indicator for the first year of Law School. Figure 1
indicates that the propensity to work increases with parental transfers before declining. Including
parental transfers directly in the pooled OLS regression yields a jointly significant cubic in
parental transfers with negative linear and cubic terms and a strong positive quadratic term.
A panel data probit model with random individual effects also produces a significant cubic in
parental transfers with the same signs on the coefficients.
Figure 2 plots the mean residuals from an OLS regression, in which total educational
debt is the dependent variable, against the intervals of parental transfers. The educational
debt regression has the same covariates as described above, excluding parental transfers. In
contrast to the propensity to work, educational debt consistently declines with parental transfers.
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Adding parental transfers to the regression indicates that educational debt significantly decreases
with parental transfers at an increasing rate. The significant negative association between
educational debt and parental transfers also arises in a tobit regression.
Table 2 reports the results of three OLS regressions which have, as the dependent variable,
the natural log of the discounted present value of accepted wages in years 1, 5 and 15 after
graduation. The discount factor used in the present value calculations is 0·95. The specification
in column (1) indicates 1·9% higher lifetime earnings for individuals with an attorney or other
professional father and 1·2% higher lifetime earnings for individuals with a manager, business
owner or teacher father. Individuals that are older than 24 upon entry to Law School earn 3%
more and individuals with an Ivy League BA earn 11% more. This latter coefficient is the only
one that is precisely estimated.
Column (2) adds parental transfers and initial assets to the regression. The coefficients
on parental transfers and initial assets are small in magnitude and not precisely estimated. An
increase of 1000 dollars in parental transfers is associated with 0·17% higher lifetime earnings.
In levels, an extra dollar of parental transfers is associated with 30 cents higher lifetime earnings.
Note that adding parental transfers weakens the coefficients on father’s occupational category.
Column (3) adds indicators for having made law review, having graduated in the top
20% of the class and years of Law School work experience. Individuals that made law review
have 21% higher lifetime earnings and individuals that graduated in the top 20% of the
class have 11% higher lifetime earnings. The coefficients on these latter two variables are
precisely estimated. Lifetime earnings are higher by 2·6% with each year of in-school work
experience. The coefficient on in-school work experience is fairly precisely estimated. In this
latter specification, the coefficient on parental transfers remains negligible and the coefficients
on father’s occupational category are further reduced.
The lifetime earnings effects reported in Table 2 are clearly biased. The amount of transfers
received during school are most probably correlated with the offspring’s potential lifetime
earnings. The bias could be in either direction. Moreover, family background, the propensity
to make law review, the propensity to graduate in the top 20% of the class and the accumulation
of in-school work experience are all likely correlated with potential lifetime earnings. The model
of optimal educational financing decisions specified in the following section serves to correct the
associations in Table 2 for biases due to unobserved heterogeneity and self-selection.
3. MODEL
In this section, the basic structure of the model and the solution and estimation methods are
discussed. The first subsection describes the decision-making environment in Law School. The
second subsection describes the decision-making environment in the post-graduation labour
market. The third subsection outlines the solution and estimation techniques. The model
corresponds to the decision problem of a single individual. However, individuals are allowed
to differ in observed and unobserved dimensions.
3.1. Law School
The choice set the individual faces, in each year of Law School, denoted as K ls , is assumed to
contain five elements: not working and not borrowing (k = 1), not working and borrowing half
the costs of Law School attendance (k = 2), not working and borrowing the full costs of Law
School attendance (k = 3), working and not borrowing (k = 4) and working and borrowing
half the costs of Law School attendance (k = 5). Discretization of debt levels in the choice set
increases tractability.
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A choice k is feasible in year t only if financial resources, denoted as ykt , are sufficient to
cover the full costs of Law School attendance. The full costs of Law School attendance consist
of tuition and fees, tc, plus minimum living expenses, c min. The feasibility constraint is thus,
ykt − (tc + c min) ≥ 0. (1)
Total financial resources during the Law School year ykt are assumed to derive from five
possible sources: parental cash transfers, tr pt , initial assets, trat , stochastic unobserved assets,
trut e
εut
, units of educational debt, where one unit is 0·5(tc+c min), and stochastic labour income,
wt e
εwt
. The choice dependent ykt ’s are specified as
y1t = tr pt + trat + trut eεut
y2t = tr pt + trat + trut eεut + 0·5(tc + c min)
y3t = tc + c min (2)
y4t = tr pt + trat + trut eεut + wt eεwt
y5t = tr pt + trat + trut eεut + wt eεwt + 0·5(tc + c min).
Stochastic unobserved assets trut eεut are meant to capture unobserved grants and scholarships,
prior summer savings, and other monetary or in-kind transfers that affect borrowing and work
decisions during the Law School year. The stochastic components of unobserved assets and
employment earnings, εut and εwt , are allowed to be contemporaneously correlated through a
bivariate normal distribution, but are assumed to be mutually serially independent. Option k = 3
always satisfies the feasibility constraint in (1).5
Consumption ckt corresponding to each choice k is specified as,
ckt = c min+ykt − (tc + c min), k = 1, 4
ckt = c min, k = 2, 3, 5. (3)
Note that consumption ckt can exceed c min only when the individual does not borrow. This
restriction captures the institutional constraints inherent in federal student aid programmes. Total
borrowing capacity is limited to tuition and fees plus living expenses (minimum consumption)
and is reduced by the extent of outside resources. It is not unreasonable to assume that a
university’s financial aid office is aware of the outside resources available to the student. Students
that apply for federal assistance must submit to the financial aid office their own or their
parent’s income tax returns, bank statements and investment records in each year that educational
loans are requested. In addition, student applications for financial aid are randomly selected for
verification by the Department of Education before educational loans are approved.
The model also assumes that it is prohibitively expensive to opt out of the federal student
aid system and borrow more than full attendance costs on the commercial market. Commercial
loans generally carry much higher interest rates than do loans available through the university,
are quite limited in extent, and are considered outside resources by the financial aid office. In
the year 2000, only 4·4% of all graduate and professional students borrowed on the commercial
market (U.S. Department of Education, 2002). This percentage is likely to be even lower in the
years 1976 through 1981. The restrictions that ckt cannot exceed c min and that outside resources
are “taxed” at a rate of 100%, when the individual is a borrower, are, therefore, reasonable.
5. It is assumed, for simplicity, that students can draw on their yearly resources in order to meet tuition payments.
That is, possible time inconsistencies in the availability of resources and the tuition payment schedule are ignored.
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The restrictions also aid in identification of the model, given the lack of data on individual
consumption levels.6
The consumption restrictions imbedded in the model imply that it would never be optimal
for a student to borrow full attendance costs when he needs to borrow only half, as long as there
is a negative effect of accumulated debt on post-graduation consumption. Further, the combined
borrowing and working option, k = 5, may be optimal even though consumption cannot exceed
c min. This latter option allows individuals to diversify between the negative future effects of
accumulated debt and the negative current and future effects of in-school work. In the non-
borrowing options, k = 1, 4, consumption can exceed c min but the decision to save excess
resources from year to year is not explicitly modelled. If data on student assets during the school
year were available, the decision to optimally allocate resources over 3 years of Law School
could have been incorporated.
The choice set allows for only two possible borrowing amounts in each year of Law
School, half attendance costs and full attendance costs. This discretization is rough but does
not contradict any observed data. Only total accumulated debt upon graduation is reported, not
yearly borrowing amounts. One drawback of specifying two discretized borrowing levels is that
a student may borrow “too much”. That is, if a student’s resources, before borrowing, add up
to more than half attendance costs, and he chooses to borrow half attendance costs, then he
would be borrowing too much in order to reach c min. Ideally, the choice set would contain a
fine enough discretization of debt levels so that the student could borrow less than half and just
enough to cover full attendance costs. The specification of only two borrowing amounts eases
computational burden at the cost of larger predicted total debt levels and thus larger estimated
measurement error in accumulated debt upon graduation.
Consumption in the chosen option in year t is assumed to generate contemporaneous utility
ukt according to a CRRA function,
ukt =
µk
λ
cλkt (4)
where 1 − λ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion. The marginal utility of consumption is
a function of k in order to capture the disutility of work effort. µk is restricted to equal one for
k = 1, 2, 3 and µ4 = µ5.
Each year in which the student chooses one of the working options an extra unit of in-school
work experience is accumulated. Accumulated work experience during Law School, hrt , obeys
the law of motion,
hrt = hrt−1 + d4(t)+ d5(t) (5)
where the choice variable, dk(t), is defined such that dk(t) = 1 if option k at time t is chosen and
dk(t) = 0 otherwise. The initial condition is hr0 = 0.
Accumulated work experience is treated as an input into the deterministic component of the
in-school wage offer function in year t , wt , the probability of making law review after the first
year of Law School, pi lr , and the probability of graduating in the top 20% of the class, pi t20.
More specifically,
wt = wt (hrt , A1, A2)eεt
pi lr = pi lr (hrt , A1, A2) (6)
pi t20 = pi t20(hrt , A1, A2)
6. See Appendix B, which is available on the Review website, for the values of tc and c min that are used in
empirical implementation. tc is a deterministic function of an individual’s residency status and class year. c min is a
deterministic function of class year.
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where wt is an exponential function of its arguments, leading to a Mincer type wage function.
pi lr and pi t20 are logistic functions ensuring that the probabilities lie in the unit interval. The
dummy variables A1 and A2 correspond to three different unobserved types of individuals in the
population, or three different mass points of permanent unobserved heterogeneity. The number
of mass points was not specified a priori but was rather determined empirically.
Each year in which the student chooses one of the borrowing options, units of debt are
accumulated. Accumulated debt during Law School, dbt , obeys the law of motion,
dbt = dbt−1 + d2(t)+ 2d3(t)+ d5(t). (7)
The initial condition is db0 = 0.
Accumulated units of debt are an input into a function that generates total educational debt
upon graduation. The total education debt function is
D3 = (0·5(tc + c min) ∗ db3). (8)
3.2. Post-graduation
The choice set an individual faces upon graduation from Law School, denoted as K ml , is assumed
to contain five employment sectors or seven alternative positions: a solo position (k = 1), a
business position (k = 2), a non-profit position (k = 3), a non-elite associate position (k = 4),
an elite associate position (k = 5), a non-elite partner position (k = 6) and an elite partner
position (k = 7).7
Employment in a particular employment sector is feasible only if a job offer is received.
The vector of first job offer probabilities is specified as,
P(1) = {1, P02, P03, P04, P05, 0, 0} (9)
where P0k denotes the probability of receiving an offer to work in position k immediately
upon graduation from Law School. The restrictions imply that recent Law School graduates can
become sole proprietors with certainty, cannot directly enter the post-graduation labour market
as partners, and face stochastic probabilities of offers in the other positions.
On-the-job offer probabilities, Pjk , j, k ∈ K ml , form the matrix,
P(t) =

1 P12 P13 P14 P15 0 0
1 1 P23 P24 P25 0 0
1 P32 1 P34 P35 0 0
1 P42 P43 P44 P45 P46 0
1 P52 P53 P54 P55 0 P57
1 P42 P43 1 P45 1 0
1 P52 P53 P54 1 0 1

(10)
for 1 ≤ t ≤ T − 1, where T is the terminal period. The restrictions imply that attorneys can
always become sole proprietors regardless of prior period position (column one). The zeros
in columns six and seven imply that an attorney must spend the prior period as an associate
before facing a non-zero partnership probability. Solo, business and non-profit attorneys can,
like partners, always continue in their respective positions. The restrictions in the matrix are
empirically motivated and do not contradict any data in the sample.
Each row vector of job offer probabilities, excluding the associate continuation probabilities,
P44 and P55, and the partnership probabilities, P46 and P57, are assumed to be multinomial
7. The classification rules used to assign individuals in the data to post-graduation employment sectors are
described in detail in Sauer (1998).
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logistic in the individual’s accumulated in-school work experience, hr3, whether the individual
made law review, lr , whether the individual graduated in the top 20% of the class, t20, and the
individual’s unobserved type. That is,
Pjk = Pjk(hr3, lr, t20, A1, A2). (11)
The multinomial logit assumption implies that only one offer will be received in each period and
ensures that all arrival rates lie in the unit interval.
Promotion and dismissal in the non-elite and elite private law firm sectors take place
within an up-or-out employment structure. The event of coming up for partnership review, at
the beginning of year t , occurs with probability Pc4(t) in the non-elite sector and probability
Pc5(t) in the elite sector. These probabilities are assumed to be zero for t < 4 and constant
otherwise. When an associate comes up for review, he is either dismissed from the sector or
promoted to partner. That is, P44 and P55 become zero and P46 and P57 become non-zero.8
The promotion probabilities P46 and P57 are assumed to be logistic functions of Law School
scholastic achievement, unobserved type and cross experience in the post-graduation labour
market,
P46 = P46(lr, t20, x2t , A1, A2)
P57 = P57(lr, t20, x1t , A1, A2). (12)
x2t denotes actual accumulated experience in the elite sector and x1t denotes actual accumulated
experience outside of the elite sector. It is important to distinguish elite sector experience since
it is thought to have considerable investment value in other sectors of the market.
x1t and x2t evolve according to the following law of motion:
x1t = x1,t−1 + d1(t)+ d2(t)+ d3(t)+ d4(t)+ d6(t)
x2t = x2,t−1 + d5(t)+ d7(t). (13)
The initial conditions are x10 = x20 = 0.
Work experience in the post-graduation labour market, work experience during Law School,
scholastic achievement in Law School and unobserved type also enter into the post-graduation
wage offer function in each position k in year t ,
lnwkt = βk0 + βk1hr3 + βk2lr + βk3t20 + βk4 A1 + βk5 A2
+βk6x1t − βk7x21t + βk8x2t − βk9x22t + εkt . (14)
The stochastic component εkt is an alternative-specific productivity shock. Productivity shocks
are assumed to be multivariate normal but are mutually serially independent.
Post-graduation consumption at time t in position k is specified as,
ckt = wkt − g(D3) (15)
where g(·) is a function which transforms total educational debt upon graduation from Law
School, D3, into yearly debt service payments. The g(·) function that is empirically implemented
assumes a loan term of 10 years, a real yearly interest rate of 5·3% and equal yearly payments.
Given the lack of data on post-graduation asset levels it is assumed that no saving and no further
borrowing occurs after graduation.9
8. O’Flaherty and Siow (1995) model up-or-out employment structures in a similar way. Spurr (1987) notes the
importance of distinguishing the timing and rate of promotion in small and large private law firms.
9. Further borrowing after graduation might take the form of lengthening the term of the loan. Lengthening the
term to 15 years does not considerably change the results. The possibilities of larger than required debt-service payments
and loan default are not incorporated into the model due to lack of data.
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Consumption in the post-graduation labour market, as in Law School, generates
contemporaneous utility according to the CRRA function in (4). Even though there is no
borrowing or saving after graduation, specification of a non-linear utility function is important
because linear utility, or pure wealth maximization, would necessarily imply that educational
debt has no effect on post-graduation career choices. The CRRA utility function after graduation
has different µk terms than during Law School in order to capture the disutility of work effort
over post-graduation employment sectors. The identifying restriction is µk = 1 for k = 3.
Estimated disutilities are thus relative to the disutility of work effort in the non-profit sector.
3.3. Solution and estimation method
Individuals are assumed to maximize expected lifetime utility by choosing in each period, until
a known terminal period T , one of the feasible discrete alternatives in the time-dependent choice
sets, K ls and K ml . The maximized objective function at any time t , Vt (t ), is given by
Vt (t ) = max{dk (t)} E
[∑T
τ=t
∑
K ls ,K ml
δτ−tA j u
k
t dk(τ )
∣∣∣∣t] (16)
where E is the expectations operator, t is the state space at time t and δA j , j = 0, 1, 2, is the
subjective discount factor. The discount factor is allowed to differ by unobserved type in order
to incorporate heterogeneity in rates of time preference. The elements of t are F0, F1, F2, Ivy,
M A, I (age > 24), O S, I (L S AT > 737), I (tr pt > 0), I (trat > 0), A0, A1, A2, lr , t20, hrt , dbt ,
x1t , x2t , dk(t − 1), εut , εwt and εkt . The maximization of the objective function is achieved by
choice of the optimal sequence of feasible control variables {dk(t)}, k ∈ K ls , K ml , given current
realizations of the stochastic elements of the model.
The maximization problem can be recast in a dynamic programming framework by
specifying the value function, Vt (t ), as the maximum over alternative-specific value functions,
V kt (t ), that satisfy Bellman (1957) equations. That is,
Vt (t ) = max[V 1t (t ), . . . , V K
i
t (t )], i = ls,ml
V kt (t ) = ukt + δA j E(Vt+1(t+1) | dk(t) = 1, t )
(17)
where the expectation is taken over the joint distribution of the random elements of the model.
Since it is difficult, in general, to find analytic solutions to dynamic programmes of this
type, the model is solved numerically by backward recursion. The solution consists of generating
E(Vt (t )), or the E maxt function, for every combination of state space elements and choices
at time t . The terminal period, T , is fixed at 15 years after graduation from Law School for each
individual and the terminal period alternative-specific E maxT is assumed to be proportional to
ukT (Rust, 1987). The proportionality constant, αT , is estimated along with the other parameters
of the model.
Calculation of the multivariate integrals in the E maxt function is accomplished by Monte-
Carlo integration, which uses 50 draws of the random elements of the model. The state space
is not too large as to necessitate interpolation and/or regression techniques (Keane and Wolpin
(1994, 1997), Rust (1997)) to recover the E maxt function. That is, a full numerical solution to
the dynamic programme is feasible. Given E maxt , the alternative-specific value functions are
known up to the current period random shocks.
The model is estimated by simulated maximum likelihood (SML). The SML procedure
that is employed assumes classification error in all reported discrete outcomes. Assuming
classification error enables a relatively small set of unconditional simulated event histories to
be used to construct the likelihood contributions for each individual in the sample. The same
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3000 simulated event histories are used to build the likelihood contribution for each of the
658 graduates. In the presence of classification error, each simulated event history is, with
positive probability, the individual’s true event history. This helps circumvent the usual problem
in frequency simulation of zero probability events reported in the data. The use of unconditional
simulations to form the likelihood, rather than conditional simulations, also “solves” the problem
of missing endogenous state variables.
The classification error process in discrete outcomes is assumed to be unbiased, implying
that the reported choice in time t is, on average, equal to the true choice in time t . This
assumption, which is akin to mean zero measurement error, yields classification error rates that
are linear in the true choice probability (see Keane and Wolpin (2001), Keane and Sauer (2002)),
pikkt = E + (1 − E)Pr(dk(t) = 1)
pik˜kt = (1 − E)Pr(dk(t) = 1).
(18)
pikkt is the classification error rate that enters the individual’s likelihood contribution in time
t whenever choice k is simulated and choice k is reported. When choice k˜ is simulated and
choice k is reported, the relevant classification error rate is pik˜kt . E is an estimable parameter and
is interpreted as the base classification error rate.
The true choice probability Pr(dk(t) = 1) in (18) is computed using a kernel-smoothed
frequency simulator over simulated choices in period t . The kernel is a logistic function of the
difference between each alternative-specific value function and the maximum over alternative-
specific value functions in period t . The bandwidth parameter in the kernel was fixed a priori
at 25.
The likelihood contribution for each individual is constructed by computing the product
of classification error rates for each simulated event history and then averaging over the total
number of simulations. If a choice is missing in period t , there is no contribution to the
product of classification error rates in that period. The likelihood contribution also includes the
observed continuous data on parental cash transfers, initial assets, educational debt, Law School
employment earnings and post-graduation accepted wages by multiplying the classification error
rates by measurement error densities. Measurement error in observed continuous outcomes is
assumed to be lognormally distributed with zero mean and estimable variance. Lognormality
ensures that theoretically positive outcomes remain positive.
The likelihood contributions also incorporate the joint probability of initial conditions. The
observed initial conditions in the model are F0, F1, F2, Ivy, M A, I (age > 24), O S and
I (L S AT > 737), I (tr pt > 0) and I (trat > 0). The values of these variables are simulated
together with the event histories. The probabilities of the observed initial conditions are denoted
as λ f0 , λ f1 , λ f2 , λivy , λma , λage, λos and λlsat , λtr p , λtra , respectively, and are estimated along
with the other parameters of the model.
The unobserved initial conditions in the model are the unobserved types A0, A1 and A2.
The type probabilities, denoted as pi A j , j = 0, 1, 2, serve as weights for the type-specific
likelihood contributions. The type probabilities are specified to be multinomial in observed initial
conditions, i.e.
pi A j = pi A j (F1, F2, Ivy, M A, I (age > 24), O S, I (L S AT > 737)), j = 0, 1, 2.
(19)
This specification incorporates heteroscedasticity in the distribution of mass points (Heckman
and Singer, 1984) and is the avenue through which family background and prior human capital
investments determine the rate of time preference, scholastic ability and potential earnings
during Law School and in the post-graduation labour market. Note that the full set of observed
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TABLE 3
Estimated marginal type probabilities by father’s occupation
Pr(Type 0) Pr(Type 1) Pr(Type 2)
Father attorney/prof. 0·138 0·358 0·504
Father mgr./teacher 0·340 0·212 0·448
Father blue collar 0·405 0·326 0·269
characteristics, except for graduation year, appear in the type probabilities. The effect of family
background on lifetime outcomes, through the type probabilities, is net of the correlation of
family background with prior human capital investments, parental cash transfers and initial
assets.10
Non-zero parental cash transfers and initial assets are assumed to be log-linear functions of
family background, age at Law School entry, residency status and unobserved type,
tr pt = tr pt (F1, F2, I (age > 24), O S, A1, A2)
trat = trat (F1, F2, I (age > 24), O S, A1, A2).
(20)
This system of equations represents the reduced form of a more general, possibly intra-family,
optimization problem that jointly determines the amount of resources available to the student
while in school. The student is assumed to take parental cash transfers and initial assets as given
when deciding among the feasible options in the choice set during Law School. Parental transfers
and initial assets are thus considered as endowments.
It is further assumed that total parental transfers and initial assets are evenly divided over
the 3 years of Law School. This latter assumption is necessary since data on yearly contributions
are not available. In this specification, parents do not explicitly react to the work decisions
of offspring, but may vary their total contributions based on the offspring’s unobserved type.
The offspring’s unobserved type partially determines whether he is a borrower or a worker.
The imbedded reduced form system in (20) is essentially a selection-corrected, non-parametric
multivariate tobit.
Maximization of the log-likelihood function proceeds by updating the parameter space,
re-solving the dynamic programme and re-simulating initial conditions and event histories
for each iteration of the optimization algorithm. Standard errors are obtained by computing
numerical derivatives and the outer product approximation to the Hessian. A general outline
of the estimation algorithm is given in Appendix D, which is available on the Review website.
4. ESTIMATION RESULTS
This section discusses specific parameter estimates of interest and model fit. The full set of
parameter estimates (149 in total) and their t-values are reported in Appendix A.
4.1. Initial conditions
The estimated parameters of the type probabilities reveal a strong relationship between family
background and unobserved type. Table 3 presents the estimated marginal type probabilities by
father’s occupation at the time of entry to Law School. Among individuals with an attorney or
other professional father, the probability of being type 2 is 0·50. The probability of being type 2 is
10. Graduation year is not an important covariate in the raw data. Directly entering the full set of observed initial
conditions into the various functions in the model is much less parsimonious and leads to identification problems.
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0·45 among those with a manager, business owner or teacher father and 0·27 among individuals
with a blue-collar or other occupation father. The ordering of the type 0 probability by father’s
occupation is reversed. The heteroscedasticity in the distribution of mass points by father’s
occupation is thus quite evident. It will also be shown below that the individual’s unobserved
type is a strong determinant of lifetime earnings. Type 2 individuals have significantly higher
lifetime earnings than type 1 individuals and type 1 individuals have significantly higher lifetime
earnings than type 0 individuals. Selection on unobservables is an important feature of the data
and this selection is significantly related to family background.
The relative importance of family background and prior human capital investments in
determining an individuals unobserved type can be summarized by their marginal effects on
the combined probability of being either type 1 or type 2. The estimated marginal effects are
0·27 for individuals with an attorney or other professional father, 0·06 for individuals with a
manager, business owner or teacher father, 0·12 for individuals with an Ivy League BA, 0·09 for
individuals with an MA, 0·04 for individuals that are older upon entry to Law School and 0·06
for individuals that scored in the top quintile of the L S AT .
The estimates of the parental cash transfer function indicate that resources available to par-
ents, as proxied by father’s occupation at the time of entry to Law School, strongly determine the
level of transfers. An individual with an attorney or other professional father receives 92% more
transfers and an individual with a manager, business owner or teacher father receives 42% more
transfers than an individual with a blue-collar or other occupation father, respectively. It is inter-
esting to note that without explicitly using data on parental transfers, Keane and Wolpin (2001)
also found that parental transfers are strongly positively correlated with parental resources.
The estimated parental transfer function also indicates that out-of-state students, who are
subject to higher tuition costs, receive 13% more transfers. Type 1 and type 2 individuals receive
1·5% more and 10% more transfers than type 0 individuals, respectively. This can be interpreted
as parents investing more in offspring with higher lifetime earnings potential. Students that are
older upon entry to Law School receive 57% less transfers, suggesting a partial substitution of
financing resources between parents and offspring. Substitutability between parental support and
offspring assets has been found before in other contexts (see Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1994).
The partial substitution of resources becomes more evident when one examines the effect of
age at entry to Law School on initial assets. Initial assets are 70% higher among older students.
This is to be expected since older students are more likely to be married and may have worked and
saved for re-entry to school. Out-of-state students have higher initial assets by 2·4% suggesting
greater savings in anticipation of higher tuition costs. Type 1 and type 2 individuals have higher
initial assets than type 0 individuals by 5·8 and 6·4%, respectively.
4.2. Law School and beyond
The estimated annual in-school wage offer function indicates substantial heterogeneity in part-
time earnings capacity. Type 1 and type 2 individuals receive 46 and 15% higher wage offers,
respectively. The return to actual in-school work experience while in school is 3·5% per year.
The probability of making law review after the first year of Law School is significantly
affected by unobserved type and in-school work experience. The estimated marginal effects are
0·13 and 0·25 for type 1 and type 2 individuals, respectively. Working during the first year of
Law School decreases the probability of making law review by 5%. The marginal effects on the
probability of graduating in the top 20% are 0·23 and 0·41 for type 1 and type 2 individuals,
respectively. However, accumulated in-school work experience does not significantly decrease
the probability of this latter measure of scholastic achievement. Significant negative effects of
in-school work experience may only exist at lower graduating percentiles.
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TABLE 4
Actual and predicted Law School choice distribution
No work No work No work Work Work
Don’t Borrow Borrow Don’t Borrow
borrow half full Total borrow half Total
Year 1
Actual — — — 0·790 — — 0·210
Predicted 0·274 0·302 0·218 0·794 0·206 0·000 0·206
Year 2
Actual — — — 0·629 — — 0·371
Predicted 0·193 0·249 0·215 0·657 0·343 0·000 0·343
Year 3
Actual — — — 0·569 — — 0·431
Predicted 0·191 0·137 0·219 0·547 0·368 0·085 0·453
TABLE 5
Actual and predicted Law School
transition matrix
No work Work
No work
Actual 0·782 0·218
Predicted 0·792 0·208
Work
Actual 0·134 0·866
Predicted 0·100 0·900
Table 4 displays the borrowing and work decisions in each year of Law School, in the actual
data and in the simulated data produced by the model at the maximum likelihood estimates.
The actual choice proportions can be calculated only for the total number of individuals in the
No Work and Work options in each year. The model can, however, predict the proportions of
individuals in the different debt subcategories in each year. The actual figures show that 21% of
the sample work during the first year of Law School. In the second year of Law School there is a
16% increase in the proportion of Law School students working. In the third year of Law School
an additional 6% choose to work. Given that the majority of the data on Law School outcomes
are 3-year totals, this yearly variation in the proportion of individuals working is quite important
for identification.
The model is capable of reproducing the sharp increase in the proportion working between
years 1 and 2 and the more moderate increase in year 3. The sharp increase from year 1 to 2 is
mostly explained by the high value of making law review in the post-graduation labour market
and the significant negative effect of working on the chances of making law review. Once the first
year law review constraint is relaxed, there is a large increase in the proportion working. Note
that part of the sharp increase in the proportion working could be due to the first year of Law
School simply being more demanding in terms of time and energy than subsequent years.
The more moderate increase in the proportion working from year 2 to 3 is due to the positive
correlation between productivity and asset shocks. Individuals that began working in year 2 and
that receive simultaneous negative productivity and unobserved asset shocks in year 3, can no
longer fully finance attendance costs by working and not borrowing. They, instead, choose to
work and borrow rather than borrow only. It is the investment value of in-school work experience
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TABLE 6
Actual and predicted educational debts, Law School earnings and Law School
scholastic achievement
Less than $15,000– More than Mean
No debt $15,000 $30,000 $30,000 debt > 0
Actual 0·388 0·226 0·273 0·113 21,021
Predicted 0·479 0·218 0·256 0·047 20,165
Earnings > 0 Mean earnings Law review Top 20
Actual 0·465 9637 0·246 0·391
Predicted 0·508 11,242 0·242 0·432
in the post-graduation labour market, and not current consumption levels, that generates the
persistence in the in-school working decisions of these latter individuals.
The overall ability of the model to reproduce the pattern of transitions between the No
Work and Work options is illustrated in Table 5. Shocks to unobserved assets and productivity
are important determinants of these transitions. The estimated mean of unobserved assets, over
3 years of Law School, is more than 20% of total out-of-state attendance costs. The relatively
high estimated mean of unobserved assets and the sensitivity to its stochastic component suggest
that summer employment is an important factor in the decision to work while in school.
The level of parental cash transfers and the disutility of work effort also substantially
influence educational borrowing and in-school work decisions. Simulations of the model reveal
that type 1 and type 2 individuals with an intermediate level of parental transfers quite often
abandon borrowing and choose to work when they receive increases in parental support. The
higher level of parental transfers combined with market wages allows these individuals to reach
higher current consumption and utility levels that outweigh the disutility of work effort. This
somewhat perverse income effect arises since working is the avenue through which individuals
increase consumption over the limited consumption that is achievable through borrowing.
Increases in parental transfers for individuals with low levels of resources generally leads to
less borrowing only.
The result that type 1 and type 2 are the individuals that are most likely to be induced to
work with an increase in parental transfers also highlights that selection into in-school work is
positively related to part-time earnings potential and scholastic ability. Type 1 and type 2 receive
significantly higher part-time wage offers and have significantly higher starting probabilities of
making law review. Selection into work is also (weakly) related to differential impatience in
consumption. The estimated discount factors for type 1 and type 2 are 0·95 and 0·86, respectively.
The discount factor for type 0 individuals is normalized to 0·95.11 The lower discount factor for
type 2 individuals helps “convince” them to work despite their lower part-time earnings capacity
relative to type 1 individuals. A factor which is also important in this regard is the willingness
to substitute consumption intertemporally. λˆ in (4) is estimated to be 0·23, which is relatively
high and more in line with the λˆ of 0·52 found in Keane and Wolpin (2001), than the λˆ of
approximately −2 typically found in the life cycle consumption literature (see Hubbard, Skinner
and Zeldes, 1994).
Table 6 presents some additional dimensions of model fit. The first panel illustrates the fit
of the model to the distribution of educational debt upon graduation from Law School. The mean
11. Discount factors are theoretically identified in finite-horizon dynamic programmes (see Wolpin, 1987), but
are often practically difficult to estimate. The normalization and minimum consumption restrictions aid in empirical
identification.
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TABLE 7
Actual and predicted post-graduation choice distribution and mean accepted
wages
Solo Business Non-profit Non-elite Elite
Year 1
Choices
Actual 0·005 0·044 0·096 0·403 0·452
Predicted 0·010 0·026 0·117 0·398 0·450
Wages
Actual 19,432 46,559 35,006 36,826 49,252
Predicted 30,643 43,011 37,791 37,187 47,088
Year 5
Choices
Actual 0·018 0·114 0·119 0·396 0·355
Predicted 0·022 0·102 0·134 0·360 0·382
Wages
Actual 43,680 55,546 40,309 53,337 62,427
Predicted 44,449 65,806 46,229 55,679 70,147
Year 15
Choices
Actual 0·047 0·188 0·119 0·368 0·278
Predicted 0·054 0·170 0·088 0·374 0·313
Wages
Actual 65,642 138,859 69,850 136,358 200,331
Predicted 54,774 128,865 64,044 138,314 171,404
Note: Wages are in 1992 dollars.
positive debt level in the sample is reproduced quite well. The middle of the distribution of debt
is also fit well but there are misses in the tails. The proportion with zero debt is overpredicted
and the proportion with very high levels of debt is underpredicted. The model is also capable
of reproducing the proportion of individuals with positive labour earnings over 3 years of Law
School but somewhat overpredicts mean positive earnings. The proportion of individuals that
make law review and graduate in the top 20% of the class is reproduced quite accurately.
The estimated post-graduation wage offer functions indicate that having made law review
increases wage offers in private law firms by 10·5%. Having graduated in the top 20% of the
class increases wage offers by a more modest 3·1%. The estimated coefficients also imply that
working 2 years during Law School raises wage offers after graduation by roughly 1·2%. This is
considerably less than the 10–14% returns to working 2 years during college estimated by Light
(2001). However, there is an additional pay-off to in-school work experience in this model. It
significantly raises the probability of getting job offers in the non-profit sector.
Table 7 displays the fit of the model to the choice distribution and mean accepted wages in
each sector in years 1, 5 and 15 after graduation. The model reproduces, fairly accurately, the
yearly choice frequencies, yearly transitions and the timing of transitions. The changing order
of mean accepted wages across sectors in each year is also reproduced quite well. The fit to
post-graduation outcomes is not substantially different from that reported and explained in Sauer
(1998), despite the different class years and added complexity of the model estimated in the
current study.
The estimated model reveals considerable selection into different post-graduation
employment sectors. In year 15 after graduation, 65% of those working in the elite sector
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(mostly as partners) are type 2, 23% are type 1 and 12% are type 0. Type 1 and type 2 constitute
88% of the elite sector, but only 67% of the sample. Of those working in the elite sector in year 15,
53% made law review and 58% graduated in the top 20% of the class. The corresponding sample
proportions are 25 and 39%, respectively. The composition of individuals in the non-profit sector
is substantially different. Of those working in the non-profit sector in year 15, 70% are type 0,
99·6% did not make law review and 75% did not graduate in the top 20% of the class.
It is important to note that, in this model, the estimated effects of in-school work experience
and scholastic achievement are causal, conditional on the model being able to capture all the
relevant aspects of decision making and conditional on the identification structure. Working in
favour of a causal interpretation is the tight parametrization of decision rules and the liberal
appearance of unobserved discrete individual effects. The discrete individual effects are random
but are not forced to follow any parametric distribution. Working against a causal interpretation is
the unidimensionality of both unobserved heterogeneity and in-school work experience. Overall,
human capital/signalling effects are reasonably distinguished from the effects of ability and/or
preferences.
4.3. Measurement error
The estimate of E in equation (18) implies that the probability that a low probability discrete
outcome is correctly classified is approximately 0·82. The probability that higher probability
discrete outcomes are correctly classified increases linearly above 0·82 as the true probability
of the event itself grows. Misclassification is thus not an essential feature of the data. The
estimated measurement error standard deviations for continuous educational financing outcomes
and for post-graduation accepted wages offers are 0·785 and 0·377, respectively. These estimated
standard deviations are relatively larger than the estimated standard deviations of shocks to
unobserved assets and productivity. The extent of measurement error is similar in magnitude
to that found in Keane and Wolpin (2001). Incorporating measurement error in continuous
outcomes is empirically important.
5. DISCUSSION
5.1. The relative importance of short-term parental cash transfers
The relative importance of short-term parental cash transfers implied by the model can be
assessed by computing linear projections of predicted lifetime earnings and consumption on
the observed covariates in Table 2 and unobserved type. The effects of the covariates displayed
in Table 8 incorporate the behavioural restrictions imposed on the data and are corrected
for unobserved heterogeneity and self-selection. The linear projections use, as data, the 3000
simulated event histories generated at the maximum point of the SML procedure.
Column (1) of Table 8 displays the results of regressing the natural log of predicted
lifetime earnings on observed initial conditions. The dependent variable is constructed by
discounting, using a discount factor of 0·95, simulated accepted wages back to the first year after
graduation from Law School. The results indicate that having an attorney or other professional
father increases lifetime earnings by 4·4% and having a manager, business owner or teacher
father increases lifetime earnings by 2·7%. These returns are considerably higher than the
corresponding estimates in Table 2.
The returns to pre-Law School human capital investments in Column (1) are 1·8, 1 and
1·3% for having an Ivy League BA, having an MA and being relatively older upon entry to
Law School, respectively. The returns to parental transfers and initial assets are both negligible.
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TABLE 8
Predicted lifetime earnings and consumption regressions
Log of lifetime earnings Log and level of lifetime consumption
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Constant 13·5677 13·4834 13·4521 13·2643 582,405
(0·0088) (0·0091) (0·0086) (0·0086) (5479)
Father attorney/prof. 0·0441 0·0015 −0·0014 −0·0027 −3667
(0·0112) (0·0104) (0·0096) (0·0096) (6160)
Father mgr./teacher 0·0266 0·0077 0·0016 0·0019 111
(0·0081) (0·0076) (0·0068) (0·0068) (4353)
Ivy League BA 0·0184 −0·0058 −0·0004 −0·0004 −5
(0·0107) (0·0099) (0·0089) (0·0089) (5696)
Master’s degree 0·0100 0·0105 0·0060 0·0054 2202
(0·0129) (0·0120) (0·0108) (0·0108) (6887)
I (age > 24) 0·0126 −0·0027 −0·0040 −0·0055 −2834
(0·0107) (0·0099) (0·0089) (0·0088) (5691)
Out-of-state resident −0·0128 0·0025 0·0002 −0·0156 −11,194
(0·0075) (0·0069) (0·0062) (0·0062) (3950)
I (L S AT > 737) 0·0195 0·0095 0·0089 0·0087 5784
(0·0083) (0·0076) (0·0069) (0·0069) (4390)
Parental transfers 0·00067 0·00008 0·00026 0·00250 1·76
(0·00042) (0·00038) (0·00035) (0·00035) (0·22)
Initial assets 0·00054 −0·00001 0·00001 0·00239 1·63
(0·00054) (0·00050) (0·00045) (0·00045) (0·29)
Type 1 0·1155 0·0777 0·0825 52,664
(0·0087) (0·0085) (0·0085) (5449)
Type 2 0·1936 0·1321 0·1308 85,585
(0·0082) (0·0081) (0·0081) (5185)
Law review 0·1877 0·1863 132,917
(0·0072) (0·0072) (4621)
Top 20% of class 0·0389 0·0390 27,948
(0·0064) (0·0064) (4115)
In-school work exp. 0·0063 0·0185 12,097
(0·0030) (0·0030) (1883)
RM SE 0·1984 0·1822 0·1639 0·1633 100,000
R2 0·0150 0·1700 0·3288 0·3541 0·3895
N 3000 3000 3000 3000 3000
Note: Parental transfers and initial assets are divided by 1000 in Columns (1) through (4). Robust standard errors
are in parentheses.
The model explains the weak returns to parental transfers through an in-school labour supply
effect that leads to lower scholastic achievement and greater work experience. The return to
in-school work experience fully compensates for the loss in earnings due to lower scholastic
achievement.
Column (2) adds the unobserved type dummies. Given the strong correlation between family
background and unobserved type, the effect of family background is wiped out. The effects of
parental cash transfers and initial assets are also further reduced in magnitude. The effect of
unobserved type is quite substantial. Type 2 individuals have 19·4% higher lifetime earnings and
type 1 individuals have 11·6% higher lifetime earnings than type 0 individuals.
1210 REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
Column (3) adds the scholastic achievement measures and accumulated in-school work
experience. Making law review and graduating in the top 20% of the class increase lifetime
earnings by 18·8 and 3·9%, respectively. The returns to accumulated in-school work experience
is 0·6% per year. Note that these latter three returns are all considerably smaller than the
corresponding estimates in Table 2. Running this specification in levels shows that an additional
dollar transferred from parent to offspring increases lifetime earnings by 25 cents. This is smaller
than the corresponding estimate of 30 cents in the raw data. The returns to unobserved type are
reduced to 7·8 and 13·2% for type 1 and type 2, respectively.
Column (4) repeats the specification in Column (3) but uses the natural log of lifetime
consumption, discounted back to the first year of Law School, as the dependent variable.
The results indicate that parental transfers and in-school work experience significantly
increase lifetime consumption. An increase of 1000 dollars in parental transfers increases
lifetime consumption by 2·5%. An extra year of in-school work experience increases lifetime
consumption by 1·8%. The strong effects of parental transfers and in-school work experience are
due to increased in-school labour supply and decreased post-graduation debt burdens.
Column (5) repeats the specification in Column (4) in levels. The estimated coefficient
on parental transfers is 1·76. An extra dollar transferred from parent to offspring increases the
lifetime consumption of offspring by 1 dollar and 76 cents. An additional regression, not shown
in the table, replaces the level of lifetime consumption with the level of post-graduation lifetime
consumption only. The estimated coefficient on parental cash transfers is 1·62. The “additionality
effect” of 76 cents can thus be decomposed into 14 cents of increased in-school consumption and
62 cents of increased post-graduation consumption. This decomposition is not very sensitive to
either the number of simulated event histories used in the linear projections nor the discount
factor used to calculate the dependent variable.
5.2. The effect of educational debt on career choices
The estimated model can also be used to examine the hypothesis, underlying many loan-
forgiveness programmes, that educational debt affects career choices. This hypothesis can be
examined by simulating the outcomes of a counterfactual loan-forgiveness programme. The
experiment is counterfactual since all of the individuals in the sample graduated before the UMLS
loan-forgiveness programme was instituted.
Loan-forgiveness programmes in many elite Law Schools in the U.S. provide subsidies to
Law School graduates that have educational debt and that choose employment in the non-profit
sector. The loan-forgiveness programme simulated in this subsection grants a subsidy, equal in
amount to the individual’s yearly debt service obligation, whenever a job in the non-profit sector
within the first 10 years of graduation is accepted. The yearly subsidies do not have to be repaid
if the individual decides to subsequently leave the sector.12
The results of the simulation are reported in Table 9. The figures show that the programme
induces a substitution effect of more borrowing during Law School. This is a sensible result
considering that loan-forgiveness reduces the price of borrowing to the extent that the student
expects to work in the non-profit sector after graduation. The effect is most pronounced on those
students that previously worked and did not borrow. These students are now more likely to not
work and borrow half of the attendance costs in each year of Law School. As a result, average
12. The University of Chicago, Columbia University, Cornell University, Georgetown University, Northwestern
University, The University of Pennsylvania, Stanford University, The University of Southern California, The University
of Virginia, and Yale University all require employment in the non-profit sector for loan-forgiveness programme
eligibility. The programmes at Harvard University, The University of Michigan and New York University are slightly
more general in that they provide assistance on the basis of income level only. See Vernon (1989) for details.
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TABLE 9
Loan-forgiveness simulation choice distributions
Law School
No work No work No work Work Work
Don’t Borrow Borrow Don’t Borrow
borrow half full Total borrow half Total
Year 1
Baseline 0·274 0·302 0·218 0·794 0·206 0·000 0·206
Forgive 0·274 0·334 0·219 0·827 0·173 0·000 0·173
Year 2
Baseline 0·193 0·249 0·215 0·657 0·343 0·000 0·343
Forgive 0·193 0·284 0·217 0·693 0·307 0·000 0·307
Year 3
Baseline 0·191 0·137 0·219 0·547 0·368 0·085 0·453
Forgive 0·191 0·145 0·238 0·575 0·341 0·085 0·425
Post-graduation
Solo Business Non-profit Non-elite Elite
Year 1
Baseline 0·010 0·026 0·117 0·398 0·450
Forgive 0·010 0·026 0·117 0·398 0·450
Year 5
Baseline 0·022 0·102 0·134 0·360 0·382
Forgive 0·022 0·101 0·151 0·347 0·380
Year 15
Baseline 0·054 0·170 0·088 0·374 0·313
Forgive 0·054 0·169 0·100 0·365 0·312
positive indebtedness in the sample increases by 5%. The predicted movement out of work and
into borrowing when borrowing becomes relatively cheaper is consistent with the findings of
Leslie (1984) and Keane and Wolpin (2001) in different contexts.
The figures also show that loan-forgiveness has virtually no effect on the first job choice
distribution. Law School graduates that previously entered the non-profit sector, mainly type 0
individuals that did not make law review, continue to enter the sector. However, they enter with
more debt. These same types also continue to enter private law firms immediately after graduation
whenever a job offer is received. The loan-forgiveness subsidies are not enough of an incentive
to forgo the considerable investment value of private law firm experience. There are, however,
more job transitions to the non-profit sector by year 5 after graduation as type 0 individuals with
poor promotion prospects in private law firms exit their jobs earlier and transit to the non-profit
sector more often. By year 15 after graduation, participation in the non-profit sector is higher by
1·2%. In terms of the baseline percentage of those in the non-profit sector, participation increases
by 13·6%.
The effect of loan-forgiveness on non-profit sector participation is not substantially different
from the effect found in Sauer (1998). However, allowing educational debt to be endogenous,
in contrast to this previous study, sheds considerable light on the costs of loan-forgiveness.
The costs of loan-forgiveness are clearly higher when debt is treated as endogenous and
individuals are allowed to borrow more in reaction to the programme. Nonetheless, costs are
kept under control since subsidies are tied to a relatively low-paying type of post-graduation
employment.
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It is important to note that the modest increases in non-profit sector participation and
educational debt levels are most probably lower bound effects. Educational loan-forgiveness
programmes should differentially attract more “non-profit” types of individuals to apply to Law
School, enter Law School, incur educational debt and enter the non-profit sector after graduation.
Parents might also reduce the amount that they voluntarily contribute to their offspring’s
education in reaction to the programme, perhaps leading to further increases in educational debt
levels.
6. CONCLUSION
In this paper a dynamic programming model of optimal educational financing decisions is
formulated and estimated. The study measures the effect of short-term parental cash transfers,
received during school, on educational borrowing and in-school work decisions, and on lifetime
outcomes. The relative importance of parental cash transfers is analysed on a different margin
than previous studies and a direct measure of parental financial support is incorporated into the
analysis. The accumulation of educational debt is explicitly modelled and treated as endogenous.
The estimated parameters of the model imply that short-term parental cash transfers do not
significantly influence lifetime earnings. The reason is that parental cash transfers encourage in-
school work among some individuals. In-school work experience hurts scholastic achievement
but has a significant pay-off in the post-graduation labour market. The negligible overall effect
implies that the returns to in-school work experience fully compensate for the loss in lifetime
earnings due to lower scholastic achievement.
Although parental cash transfers do not significantly affect post-graduation lifetime
earnings, they do significantly affect lifetime consumption. When individuals can optimally use
parental transfers as a wage subsidy, they achieve higher levels of consumption while in school
and after graduation. When individuals borrow less with increases in parental transfers, they
achieve higher levels of post-graduation consumption only. An extra dollar transferred from
parent to offspring is estimated to increase mean lifetime consumption by 1 dollar and 76
cents. The additionality effect of 76 cents is decomposed into 14 cents of increased in-school
consumption and 62 cents of increased post-graduation consumption.
The estimated parameters of the model also suggest that educational debt has only a
modest influence on post-graduation career choices. A simulated counterfactual loan-forgiveness
programme that subsidizes debt payments in return for accepting a job in the non-profit sector
increases non-profit sector participation by 1·2% in year 15 after graduation. Mean indebtedness
also increases by 5% as the cost of borrowing is reduced and some individuals choose to borrow
more instead of working.
The policy implications of the study are that, in the short run, tuition tax credits and other
government incentive schemes aimed at encouraging parents to finance a greater proportion of
education costs will not have large effects on the career choices and post-graduation lifetime
earnings of offspring. Expanding loan-forgiveness programmes will also not substantially affect
post-graduation outcomes. However, expanding loan-forgiveness will lead to more student
indebtedness.
Due to data and computational limitations, the model in this paper could not explicitly
take into account the decision to optimally allocate resources over different school years nor the
decision to work and save during summers. A more complete model would incorporate these
decisions as well as the decision of parents to alter contributions in reaction to the educational
borrowing and work decisions of their children. Future research could also examine the effect
of loan-forgiveness on the decisions to acquire and complete different levels and types of
education.
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A. SML PARAMETER ESTIMATES AND t-VALUES
TABLE A.1
Initial conditions
Unobserved type probability and endowment level parameters
Variables pi A1 pi A2 ln(tr pt ) ln(trat )
Constant −0·114 −0·434 8·150 8·134
(−0·32) (−1·24) (53·98) (45·78)
F1 1·186 1·648 0·916 0·128
(2·19) (2·98) (3·71) (0·54)
F2 −0·284 0·731 0·420 −0·013
(−0·71) (2·01) (2·44) (−0·08)
Ivy 0·035 0·592
(0·05) (1·16)
I (age0 > 24) −0·343 0·338 −0·572 0·703
(−0·56) (0·72) (−2·29) (2·13)
M A −0·971 −0·061
(1·63) (−0·09)
O S −0·334 −0·400 0·130 0·024
(−0·92) (−1·17) (0·87) (0·16)
I (L S AT ≥ 737) 0·458 0·466
(1·10) (1·21)
A1 0·015 0·058
(0·07) (0·28)
A2 0·096 0·064
(0·47) (0·35)
Observed type and endowment probability parameters
λ f1 λ f2 λivy λage λma λos λlsat λtr p λtra
−0·815 0·045 −1·800 −1·7299 −2·361 0·474 −1·117 0·444 −0·033
(−2·84) (0·16) (−6·56) (−7·00) (−7·95) (1·65) (−3·81) (1·68) (−0·12)
Note: t-Values are in parentheses. pi A j and λ f j are multinomial logits. λivy , λma , λage , λos , λlsat λtr p
and λtra are binomial logits. The estimates in the bottom panel are the constant terms that enter the logistic
transformations.
TABLE A.2
Unobserved asset, Law School wage offer and scholastic achievement parameters
Variable ln(trut ) ln(wt ) pi lr pi t20
Constant 7·759 8·315 −2·148 −1·301
(2·50) (48·17) (−20·08) (−1·90)
hrt 0·035 −0·354 0·001
(2·22) (−3·15) (0·53)
A1 0·458 1·050 1·050
(2·28) (2·25) (2·25)
A2 0·152 1·524 1·524
(1·60) (2·97) (2·97)
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TABLE A.2—continued
Law School error distribution, utility function and discount factor parameters
ln(L11) L21 ln(L22) ln(1 − µ4) λ δA1 δA2
−2·116 0·061 −2·694 −1·960 0·228 0·946 0·856
(−0·92) (1·59) (−1·50) (−1·98) (48·17) (2·01) (2·52)
Measurement error, classification error and terminal value function parameters
ln(σls ) ln(αls ) ln(σml ) ln(αml ) E αT
−0·242 8·038 −0·976 0·108 0·821 2·859
(−9·50) (108·58) (−74·20) (2·56) (141·42) (1·09)
Note: t-Values are in parentheses. pi lr and pi t20 are binomial logits. The L i j ’s are
the Cholesky elements for the bivariate normal distribution (εut , εwt ). σ 2ls is the
common measurement error variance for the observed continuous data on initial
assets, parental transfers, educational debts and in-school earnings. σ 2
ml is the
common measurement error variance for post-graduation accepted wage offers. αls
and αml are shift parameters for misclassified continuous data pertaining to Law
School outcomes and post-graduation outcomes, respectively. E is the common
base classification error rate for all discrete outcomes in the model. αT is the
common terminal value proportionality constant.
TABLE A.3
Post-graduation wage offer, error distribution and utility function parameters
Variable Solo Business Non-profit Non-elite Elite
Constant 10·330 10·664 10·530 10·441 10·681
(93·57) (148·18) (152·09) (353·84) (360·00)
A1 0·026 0·026
(0·52) (0·52)
A2 0·054 0·054
(1·31) (1·31)
lr 0·105 0·105
(3·21) (3·21)
t20 0·031 0·031
(0·99) (0·99)
hr3 0·007 0·005 0·005
(0·24) (0·37) (0·37)
x1t 0·106 0·104 0·052 0·103 0·078
(1·12) (3·14) (2·17) (48·16) (4·38)
x21t −0·005 −0·003 −0·001 −0·009
(−0·75) (−1·30) (−0·40) (−3·37)
x2t 0·105 0·124 0·081 0·122 0·098
(1·87) (4·70) (2·15) (4·35) (4·25)
x22t −0·011 −0·003 −0·001 −0·002 −0·001
(−1·17) (−0·92) (−0·07) (−0·43) (−0·40)
Part . 0·080 0·070
(353·53) (106·59)
ln(Lkk ) −1·785 −1·785 −3·253 −4·191 −3·868
(−12·97) (−12·97) (−1·89) (−1·81) (−2·14)
L2k −0·157
(−6·01)
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TABLE A.3—continued
Variable Solo Business Non-profit Non-elite Elite
L3k 0·034 0·054
(0·48) (0·89)
L4k −0·013 −0·006 −0·001
(−0·33) (−0·16) (−0·02)
ln(1 − µk ) −0·895 −2·862 −2·788 −2·881
(−0·16) (−0·40) (−131·03) (−1·31)
Note: t-Values are in parentheses. The L jk ’s are the Cholesky elements for the joint
normal distribution εkt , k = 1, . . . , 7.
TABLE A.4
Post-graduation offer probability parameters
Non-elite Elite Non-elite Elite
Variable Business Non-profit associate associate partner partner
Constant 1·018 2·109 2·676 2·676 0·557 −1·970
(1·51) (1·37) (2·15) (2·15) (1·75) (−1·67)
A1 −0·070 0·1643 0·5590 1·394 0·683
(−0·95) (1·26) (1·89) (2·15) (1·79)
A2 0·108 1·268 1·364 1·515 2·832
(1·05) (1·91) (2·17) (2·61) (2·87)
lr 0·695 2·257 2·257 3·255 6·018
(2·03) (2·22) (2·22) (3·10) (4·25)
t20 0·474 0·314 0·314 0·515 1·677
(1·94) (1·68) (1·68) (1·51) (1·86)
hr3 0·016 0·016 0·016 0·016
(1·20) (1·20) (1·20) (1·20)
I (t ≥ 4) −0·070 −0·070 −0·070 −0·070
(−0·34) (−0·34) (−0·34) (−0·34)
Solo −7·190 −7·190 −7·190 −7·190
(−1·64) (−1·64) (−1·64) (−1·64)
Business −8·185 −8·185 −8·185
(−1·75) (−1·75) (−1·75)
Non-profit −3·521 −3·639 −5·735
(−1·35) (−1·36) (−1·61)
Non-elite −3·786 −3·638 −6·415
(−1·29) (−1·32) (−1·51)
Elite −2·673 −2·078 −1·997
(−1·89) (−1·99) (−2·05)
x1t 0·332
(1·05)
x2t 0·027
(0·98)
Pck −2·931 −3·275
(−2·01) (−2·52)
Note: t-Values are in parentheses. The first job offer probabilities and on-the-job offer
probabilities are multinomial logits. The probability of coming up for review and the partnership
probabilities are binomial logits. The estimates corresponding to Pck are the constant terms that
enter the logistic transformations.
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